The paradox is difficult to ignore. Afghanistan is drawing closer to Russia and Central Asia diplomatically and economically, even as the Taliban regime dismisses increasingly explicit warnings from these same countries about the terrorist threat emanating from Afghan territory.
Afghanistan’s relations with Central Asia are thriving, at least on the face of it. The Afghan regime and its media regularly boast about increasing diplomatic and economic cooperation with Central Asia, China, Iran and Russia.
This cooperation has resulted in meaningful benefits, particularly for Afghanistan in terms of business and trade.
According to Afghan authorities, the total trade volume increased from approximately $1.8 billion in 2024 to $2.7 billion in 2025. More than $1.27 billion in trade was recorded between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries during the first five months of 2026.
Similarly, trade between Russia and Afghanistan surged 2.6 times in just the first two months of 2026, reaching approximately $500 million.
To put this into perspective, the $500 million recorded in early 2026 nearly matched the $538 million generated over the entire 12 months of 2025.
Since Russia accepted the credentials of Afghanistan’s ambassador in January 2026, there have been nine high-profile diplomatic engagements between Russia and Afghanistan, including Russia’s declaration of a full-fledged partnership and the signing of a Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement with Afghanistan in May.
Additionally, Afghanistan participated in the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June, while a series of high-level engagements have taken place in September.
Similarly, there has been a flurry of diplomatic engagements within Russia’s sphere of influence in Central Asia.
These include the Afghanistan-Central Asia Consultative Dialogue in Kabul in April, the Termez Dialogue in Uzbekistan in June and the Afghanistan-Central Asia Think Tank Forum in June, besides numerous other bilateral engagements focusing on enhanced connectivity and economic integration.
Given this context, even the Taliban regime and its emerging cadre of political commentators should acknowledge the pragmatic nature of Russia’s and Central Asia’s expanding diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan.
Similarly, the theory and practice of international relations would suggest that Afghanistan should be very considerate of the security concerns of Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
But here lies the geostrategic riddle: why is the Taliban regime and its propaganda machinery so dismissive of the concerns raised by Russia and the CSTO regarding the presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan?
Russia has offered the Taliban regime many opportunities for high-profile diplomatic engagement in recent months, and the recent signing of a defence agreement further reinforced Russia’s emphasis on diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan.
It is in this context that the CSTO’s and Russia’s categorical and vociferous proclamations about the presence of thousands of terrorists in Afghanistan become highly significant.
During the past five years of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the CSTO has remained consistent in identifying the terrorist threat from Afghanistan, particularly the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), whose propaganda and activities directly affect the region and its citizens.
Border security vis-à-vis Afghanistan has remained a cornerstone of the CSTO’s policy framework and a primary concern for its member states.
Tajikistan, in particular, has been troubled by reports of Islamic State and other criminal operatives freely crossing the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border.
Interestingly, in June 2021, Russia and the CSTO assessed that multiple terrorist outfits remained active in Afghanistan.
Today, after the passage of five years, that assessment remains unchanged despite all the tall claims of the Afghan regime.
Despite enhancing their counter-terrorism infrastructure, CSTO countries remain deeply worried about their porous southern borders with Afghanistan.
Over the past five years, the CSTO has remained united in monitoring the “Afghan factor” to check the spillover of illegal human smuggling, drug trafficking and extremist ideologies.
In the recent past, there have been several public announcements, statements and warnings categorically stating that the threat from Afghanistan is increasing rather than decreasing.
On May 20, 2026, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed that between 18,000 and 23,000 militants were currently active inside Afghanistan, warning that the issue remained a major concern for neighbouring states.
In 2026, there have been at least seven incidents of attempted criminal or militant infiltration from Afghanistan into Tajikistan.
The ensuing firefights with Tajik border guards along the border have resulted in the deaths of 17 Afghan nationals.
Viktor Vasiliev, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the CSTO, Andrei Belousov, Russia’s Defence Minister, and Vladimir Putin himself have made strongly worded statements in the last two months about prioritising the security of the Tajik-Afghan border.
A recent report by the International Crisis Group, authored by Ibrahim Bahees, points out that many regional countries close to Afghanistan have been willing to engage with it based on the “underlying rationale that a stable Afghanistan even if ruled by ideological disciplinarians is preferable to an unstable one… so long as the Taliban can control militant groups inside Afghanistan”.
The report further points out that “authorities have struggled to impose the ban [on poppy cultivation] in the country’s mountainous northern terrain”.
The mining boom in the north is also creating socioeconomic problems and ethnic frictions.
It is in this context that the ICG report says, “Many of the country’s drug smuggling networks have shifted to the north, exporting narcotics to Central Asia and beyond”.
All the above arguments notwithstanding, the Taliban leadership, demonstrating a typical “holier than thou” attitude, has treated the opinions of Russia and the CSTO with disdain.
This attitude exposes the self-defeating contradictions in the Afghan regime’s propaganda.
On the one hand, the Afghan regime insists that Russia and its allies in the CSTO are particularly wary of any American involvement in Afghanistan under the pretext of counter-terrorism operations.
If that is the case, then the million-dollar question is: why are Russia and the CSTO echoing the concerns of Pakistan and the US regarding the terrorism threat emanating from Afghan soil?
The Taliban regime has developed standard rebuttals to claims of terrorist hideouts in Afghanistan levelled by Pakistan and other Western countries.
The assertions by Pakistan and the West about the presence of terrorists on Afghan soil are framed as historical enmity and hostile interventionism.
However, the Taliban regime remains equally dismissive of the grave assessments made by the CSTO and Russia regarding terrorism in Afghanistan, despite acknowledging its otherwise friendly relations with these countries.
No one in the Taliban regime or its propaganda machinery has yet been able to explain the possible “subversive” intent behind the public expressions of security concerns by Russia and the CSTO.
It is becoming increasingly obvious that, due to various insecurities regarding the stability of the Afghan regime, it has become stuck in a rut of knee-jerk reactions to any criticism or perceived criticism.
The regime has been in denial for so long that it has become a captive of its own narratives, struggling to acknowledge even the clearest and most present dangers identified by its closest allies.
It is about time that the Afghan regime realised that there are no conspiracy theories to be hatched about the security concerns of Russia and the CSTO.
These countries are not heavily investing in diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan just to undermine it with flimsy accusations about the terrorist threat from Afghan soil.
The convergence of security assessments by Western countries and the Russia-CSTO bloc should act as a potent call to action for the Afghan regime against terrorist threats emanating from its soil.
Central Asia and South Asia want connectivity and trade. Neither region has anything to gain from blaming the Afghan regime as a source of instability.
If Afghanistan is to truly become a bridge between Central Asia and South Asia, then it must let go of egotistical rhetoric and initiate a transparent purge of extremist actors on its soil.
The author is an Mphil scholar in International Relations.
