From the moment Sanae Takaichi stood in parliament and declared that a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, the tectonic plates of East Asian security shifted. Her remarks this November did more than spark diplomatic tension—they signalled a decisive move away from Japan’s longstanding post-war pacifism toward a far more volatile era of militarised policymaking.
The phrase “survival-threatening situation” refers to the controversial 2015 security legislation introduced under Shinzo Abe, which allows Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to act when Japan’s survival is deemed at risk—even if Japan is not directly under attack. Takaichi, widely viewed as Abe’s political successor, is now pushing this framework into far more dangerous territory than originally intended.
During the 7 November parliamentary session, Takaichi explicitly linked Taiwan to this threshold. If China attempted to seize Taiwan through military force, she argued, Japan’s Security Council could declare a survival-threatening situation, paving the way for JSDF intervention. Until now, Japan had maintained a posture of strategic ambiguity. Her statement replaced that ambiguity with a clear red line.
Beijing’s reaction was immediate and severe. China’s foreign ministry condemned the comments as interference in its internal affairs, urged Japan to retract them, and warned of consequences. It also issued travel advisories for Chinese citizens visiting Japan. Meanwhile, Japanese society remains divided. A Kyodo News poll found that 48.8% support exercising collective self-defense in a China–Taiwan conflict, while 44.2% oppose it. At the same time, 60.4% support accelerating defence spending to reach 2% of GDP.
The repercussions extend well beyond rhetoric. The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in China) have once again surfaced as potential flashpoints. On 16 November, a formation of Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered nearby waters on what Beijing called a “rights enforcement patrol.” The timing—days after Takaichi’s remarks—was widely interpreted as deliberate signalling.
Japan’s political shift is sweeping and risky. On one hand, Takaichi is responding to the reality of a powerful neighbour asserting territorial claims and military pressure near Japan’s western flank. Taiwan lies only 110 km from Japan’s Yonaguni Island, and any conflict in the Taiwan Strait would have direct consequences for Japan’s security and maritime routes. On the other hand, tying Japan’s survival directly to Taiwan’s fate moves the country beyond a defensive posture and closer to proactive military engagement.
Under Takaichi’s leadership, Japan is rapidly advancing multiple defence reforms—from raising spending to easing arms export restrictions and reconsidering its long-standing non-nuclear principles. The contours of a strategic transformation—from self-defence to power projection—are emerging.
Yet the risks of miscalculation are stark. Japan–China relations remain officially guided by four bilateral political documents and the one-China policy. Takaichi’s framing of Taiwan as an existential threat is seen by Beijing as a breach of those commitments. Xinhua characterised her stance as “militaristic adventurism,” insisting that Taiwan is not closely tied enough to Japan to justify invoking the survival clause.
Domestically, Japanese society is again wrestling with debates reminiscent of 2015, when the legalisation of collective self-defence prompted nationwide protests. Now the question has shifted: not whether Japan may defend itself, but whether it should prepare to intervene alongside the United States—or even independently—in a Taiwan contingency. The narrative of Japan as an inherently pacifist nation is fading.
The United States, while relying on Japan as a key ally, has historically maintained strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan. Tokyo’s explicit linkage of Taiwan to its survival complicates Washington’s calculus, potentially positioning Japan as the trigger point in a future U.S.–China confrontation. Beijing clearly interprets it that way, accusing Japan of dragging the United States into conflict.
If this trajectory continues, East Asia could face several destabilising outcomes: formal Japanese policy treating Taiwan as integral to its own security, a more expeditionary JSDF capable of overseas intervention, and accelerated economic and diplomatic deterioration with China. Tourism from China is already under threat; trade and investment could follow.
Still, a more cautious path remains possible. Domestic backlash, regional pushback, and U.S. pressure could compel Tokyo to clarify or soften its stance. But hesitation may come too late, potentially locking Japan into a strategy that prioritises deterrence through escalation.
Japan now faces a profound irony. A nation whose pacifist constitution was built from the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is poised to raise its military profile not just for self-defence, but for intervention. The legacy of its past militarism continues to cast a shadow. Japan must decide whether its renewed defence posture will be a protective shield or a forward-pointing spear.
Ultimately, Takaichi’s position represents a point of no return. By placing Taiwan within the “survival-threatening situation” framework, she has eliminated ambiguity and asserted Japan’s right to act in defence of a regional partner whose security it now equates with its own. In Tokyo, this may be seen as strength; in Beijing, as provocation. Across the region, it raises the chilling possibility that the next crisis will engulf not only Taiwan, but Japan itself.
If mishandled, this moment may mark a profound strategic pivot—one that brings the region closer to a broader conflict than many anticipate. Japan may believe it is reinforcing its defences; in reality, it could be ushering in a new era of great-power confrontation.
